Background
By the early-fourteenth century at the latest, the mediaeval theory of supposition could be divided in most authors into two main branches, which in recent literature have come to be called the theory of "supposition proper" and the theory of "modes of personal supposition," respectively.
2 While the relation between these two branches remains obscure, we can say to a rst approximation that the theory of supposition proper was a theory of "reference," designed to answer the question what entity or entities a term refers to or "supposits" for in a given occurrence in a given proposition, whereas the theory of modes of personal supposition, whatever its ultimate purpose, was the part of the theory that included the muchdiscussed accounts of "descent to singulars" and "ascent from singulars." Philosophy, New York 1982, Ch. 9 (188-96) . This terminology was rst used by T.K. Scott in the "Introduction" to his translation of John Buridan's Sophismata, and is not mediaeval. See T.K. Scott (trans.), John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, New York 1966, 29-42. 3 For an account of this second part of the theory, and a discussion of some of the diYculties surrounding it, see Paul Vincent Spade, Burley and to the Early Ockham, in: Vivarium, 34 (1996), 192-230. 9 In fact, this occurs only in cases of what Burley calls "simple discrete terms," for exambut they disagreed fundamentally about supposition proper, particularly about the kinds of supposition known as "personal" and "simple." 5 Even there, however, they agreed on the main paradigm cases. In "Every man is mortal", for example, they both held that "man" is in personal supposition and supposits for individual human beings; in "Man is a species", they both held that "man" is in simple supposition and supposits for the universal man. 6 Their disagreement was over what is going on in these and other cases, both metaphysically and semantically.
Metaphysically, Ockham was a nominalist. For him, talk about universals-which had been an important part of logical discourse ever since Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry's Isagoge came to be included in the logical corpus-only makes sense as talk about universal concepts in the mind.
7
Of course, like everything else in Ockham's ontology, concepts are metaphysically individual. Some of them, nevertheless, can be regarded as universal "by representation," so to speak; they are general concepts (mental representations) of many individuals at once. Burley, by contrast, was a metaphysical realist of some kind or other.
8 For him, talk about species and genera is talk about the world.
Semantically, the main basis for the disagreement between Burley and Ockham was over signi cation, and hence over the proper way to de ne personal and simple supposition. For Ockham, a term in personal supposition always supposits for what it signi es (that is, for everything it signi es), which is always one or more individuals (there are nothing but individuals in Ockham's ontology), whereas in simple supposition it supposits non-personally for a mental concept. For Burley, on the other hand, a term in personal supposition does not always supposit for what it signi es, and indeed only rarely does so; 9 it is typically only in simple sup-
